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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a study of modern Japanese financial institu-
tions, especially the central bank and city banks, focusing on " over-
draf t" problems. 
The uniqueness of central banking is the i nterdependency among the 
governmental sector, the central bank and other financial institutions . 
The resulting phenomenon, city banks' overdraft , has become one of the 
crucial issues in the Japanese economy . The strategy of the interdepen-
dency seemed t o creat e an absence of proper central banking policies, so 
that the growing economy, accompanied by the low interest rate policy, 
has forced the central bank to loan t o city banks without proper restric -
tions . Thus city banks have turned out to be an overgrown sector 
accompanied by many overgrown enterprises; and that was als o caused by 
the underdevelopment of the capital market. This speculati on seems to 
form the basis for the modern structure of the Japanese financ ial system . 
The books which I studied and used in this paper were wr itten by 
several economists and critics in Japan. Following the historical move-
ment of this financial system in recent years, various facts and 
definitions they made can be analyzed into two st ages subject to the 
Japanese financial structure. In order to compare and clar ify the " over-
draft" problem, the two-stage analysis presented in the paper is one of 
the best ways to derive the nature of the Japanese financial system. 
These two stages are focusing on the period that the low in t erest policy 
performed and the pe r iod that the recent continuous surplus of the inter -
national balance . 
2 
Finally, the above studies on the modern J apanese financia l system 
are mostly based upon researched statistical data which were provided by 
the Bank of Japan and related governmental institutions . 
3 
II . THE BANK OF JAPAN 
A. Its institut ional movement and interdependency 
The most c rucial factor which makes Japan so strongly and specially 
different f rom ot her developing countries is the interdependency between 
the Bank of Japan and the Japanese gover nment . The chain for the rela-
tionship is caused by the law of the Bank of Japan . 
The law of the Bank of Japan was primarily issued by the government 
in 1882 . The validat ion for it was renewable every 30 years. But during 
World War II, the validation of the law expired and was renewed by the 
militari ly es tablished government which adopted the main idea from the 
N . 1 a z i s . Thus the law of the Bank of Japan has been changed i n a mil ita-
ristic controlling fashion and the validation has been set up f or an 
infinite per iod of t ime . After World War II, gradually criticism toward 
the amendment of many parts of the law arose. Moreover, the policy board 
was established as a supreme decision- making committee i n 1949, composed 
of the president of the Bank of Japan as the chairman, a representative 
from the Finance Min istry, a representative from the Economic Planning 
Authority , a representative from the City Bank, a representative f r om the 
Industrial Association, a representative from Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery , and a representative from Finance Circles . 
1who adopted govern~ental sovereignty in central banking . 
4 
Si nce then, the conunittee makes mos t of the decisions ab out central 
banking problems . However, as was ment ioned before, the l aw of the Bank 
of Japan has been a great d isturbance to the commit tee and has been argued 
about cons tant ly since the fo llowing articles i n t he law clear ly provide 
a s e r ious governmental intervention i nto central banking . 
1. The 42nd artic le i n the law states, "The .. . Bank of Japan is 
unde r the s upervision of the competent min ister." 
2. The 43rd article in the law states, "The .. . compet ent minister 
may orde r the Bank of Japan to carry out any changes in the 
art ic les of assoc iation or to carry out other necessary items 
in order t o reach the objec t of the Bank of Japan under t he 
c onfirmed special necessi ty . 
Ther efore, the above two art icles i n the l aw are, by all means, 
described as the failure of the independence of the centra l bank . 
For this controvers ial issue , there we r e several monetary sys t em 
inves tigation committees established f r om 1949 t o 1957 . Their purposes 
were t o discuss the four maj or problems i n the central banking criticism 
at the time: 
1 . The degree of the competence of the Finance Minister in 
central banking ; 
2 . The limi t ation of the Bank of Japan notes ; 
3 . The acceptance of the national debt by t he Ban k of Japan; 
4 . Special emergency financing of the Bank of J a pan. 
The comple:e amenamenL of the law of the Bank of Japan r eques t ed by 
those committ ees was s ubmitted to the Finance Ministe r at t hat t ime , but 
5 
it simply broke out after a different interpretation in the degree of 
the independence of the Bank of Japan . 
In 1964, the Japanese economy started to break i nt o the inter-
national level and began to harmonize its economy through IMF,
2 
OECD,
3 
4 and BIS . The international trend for ced the Japanese central banking 
policies to be amended in order to meet international s tandards. Thus, 
in 1965, "The Finance Ministry Original Plan" was issued with a new 
item. The item empha sized the promotion of the cr edit system. That is 
t o say, the Bank of Japan, as well as the government , would gain its 
controlling power in centra l banking more than ever before . 
More specifically, Table 1.1 shows the comparison of those arguments 
concer ning the law of the Bank of Japan. Fr om this table, we may conclude 
the following facts wh ich would clearly explain the existence of inter-
dependency of the Bank of Japan with the government . 
1 . Fifty- five percent of the capital of the Bank of Japan is 
provided by the government in the existing situation . This 
shows the government has absolute power in central banking . 
2 . The staff members in the Bank of Japan are mostly controlled by 
the government (because the appointing power is directly and 
indirect ly held by the government ) . 
3 . Central bank i ng policies have to be approved by the finance 
minister or the cabinet . 
2
Internationa L Monetary Fund. 
3 0rganizat ~v: of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
4
Bank for Int~rnational Settlement . 
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Clear ly , i tem l appears to he Lhc most powerfu l g overnmental 
intervention and items 2 and J are obviously the supplementary issues 
about the governmental intervention . 
B. Its system and the role it ~ 
The major financial policies in Japan are discount - rate policy, debt 
balance control and the operation for the rate of the reserve fund . 
Discount rate policy is perfonned when there is a necessity for 
changing the loan i nterest rate of the central bank against commercial 
banks in order t o balance business fluctuat ions . Debt balance control 
is needed when the central bank makes the debt transaction with commer-
cial banks in order to achieve a balanced distribution of money flow in the 
the financial system, and the operation of the deposit rate for reserve 
fund is indirectly related to the central bank 's duty of keeping commercial 
banks' deposits in it in order to i nfluence conunercial banks ' lending 
behavior. 
Therefore, before going into the analysis, the substantial duties of 
the central bank should be introduced. 
First of all, we may look over the principal account of the Bank of 
Japan, as shown in Table 1 . 2 . 
The major items in the property account are discount draft and loan, 
bonds (including government debt) and foreign currency (overseas property 
account ). 
Bank notes occupied most of the debt account . If we look at Figure 1.1 
bank notes seemed to have a constant rate of increase each year in the 
system. On the other hand, those three major items in the pr operty account 
8 
Table 1.2 . The princ i pal account in 197la 
Property Debt and capital 
Unit: One hundred million 
Gold and metal 308 Bank note 64,077 
Discount draft and loan 6,808 Financial i ns titut ion - 2 > 947 
Government debt and bond 15 > 631 Deposit 980 
Overseas property account 47,979 Governmental deposit 4 > 612 
Others 6,467 Capital , r eserve f und 4,5 76 
Total 77'195 77>195 
aSource: (10). 
7 
6 
5 
4 
9 
Unit: One hundred million yen 
3 ~~~___.__._~~~I~~______.~ 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
Figur e 1 . 1 . Bank Note 
3 
~ c1non oll11nDD O 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
Figure 1 . 2 . Loan 
3 ~ndon nnDODDD 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
Figure 1 . 3. Bonds 
5 - ~ 4_ 3 -2 1 
D n j I 0 t=I t=l n C:i n rt II r1 
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
Figur e 1 . 4 . For eign Currency 
10 
are largely f luc tuat ing . 5 The transaction par t ners for those accounl s 
would be ei ther government or financial instit ut ions (mainly bank). For 
instance, Case I : If the Bank of Japan buys government debt f r om 
corranercial banks, then an increase in the amount of government debt in the 
Bank of Japan will result in an increase in the commercial banks ' deposit 
in the Bank of Japan for exchange, since the banks' deposit in the Bank 
of Japan yields no interest. It also results in a decrease in the 
commercial banks ' debt t o the Bank of Japan. 
Case II: If the international balance ' s s urp l us continues, the 
government buys foreign currency fr om commercial banks . Thus an increase 
i n the government's for eign cur rency reserve will force the government to 
s e ll foreign c urrency t o the Bank of Japan . Then the Bank of Japan wi ll 
i ncr ease i t s foreign currency reserve and the government 's deposit in the 
Bank of Japan also increases . Reciprocally, when the government buys 
foreign currency from cormnercial banks, a decr ease i n the amount of 
government's deposi t in the Bank of Japan will result . Meanwhile, an 
increase i n the commercial banks ' deposit in the Bank of Japan will result 
i n a decrease i n the amount of the commercial banks' debt t o the Bank of 
Japan. 
This shows that if we neglect the fluctuations in the government ' s 
deposit and the financial ins t itutions ' deposit i n the centra l bank, then 
the foreign currency wh ich the government b ought will possibly r esult i n a 
r eduction of the Bank of Japan' s loan to financial institutions and so 
weaken t he Bank of Japan's cont~olling power over them. 
5 see Figures 1. 1 - 1 . 4 . 
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The balance sheet of capital would probably be the best figure to 
explain the central banking policies . 
We may notice that the difference between the principal account and 
the balance sheet of capital are as follows: 
Table 1.3. Principal account 
Assets 
(B) Loans against financial 
institut ion 
(C) Debt against institut ion 
(D) Debt against government 
(E) Foreign currency against 
government 
Liabilities & St ockholde4s 
(A) Bank notes against financial 
institution 
Table 1.4. The balance sheet of capitala 
Bank note 
Financial capitalb 
The Bank of Japan's creditc 
Loan 
Debt operation 
Year 
(A) 
(D) + (E) 
(B) + (C) 
(B) 
(C) 
aFinanc ial capital includes tax and government debt a ssume govern-
ment 's deposit; balance is unchanged. 
bAccurately, "Financial Capital" is the difference of financial 
capital against civilian revenue and expenditure. 
c"The Bank of Japan's c redit" is "The Bank of Japan's capital supply 
against financial institution". 
12 
From Table 1.3: 
A2'B+C+D+E 
then 
A - (D + E) ~ C + B6 
where 
D + E is financial capital 
B + C is the Bank of Japan's credit. 
For an extreme case, if 
(D + E) < o7 and (D + E) > A 
then 
(B + C) < 0. 
This implies that the Central Bank withdraws its capital from money 
market inst itutions . 
Furthermore, the balance sheet of capital can be used to describe 
financial institutions. For example, an increase in bank notes will be 
viewed to mean that financ i al institutions become tense, and vice versa 
when a large amount of excess payments of financial capital occurs. In 
other words, if financial institutions are lacking capital, then the Bank 
of Japan will be forced to provide the capital for t hem. It als o means 
that the surplus of the Bank of Japan's credit will be the parameter for 
financial institutions' money flow movements . 
6For simplicity, I have ignored the fl uc tuations of deposits and 
ot hers. In fac t : A - (D + E) # (B + C) . 
7 (D + E) < 0 i s the case that financial capital's balance against 
civilian is in an excess revenue situation. 
13 
Now, we seem to reach a point that the Bank of Japan ' s credit is a 
conditional parameter for the money flow of financial institutions. Hence, 
in order to have more understanding of the Bank of Japan's credit, other 
factors which appear with it in balance sheet account should be introduced . 
1. Bank notes: Its movement during recent years in Japan has been 
stabilized at a constant rate of increase as mentioned in Figure 
1.2 . It implies that long-term economic growth is being 
substantially achieved in Japan without considering the problem 
of the financial system. Thus, basically, the Bank of Japan's 
credit is surplus. 
2 . Financial capital's revenue and expenditure against private 
sources. 
When government excess outgo results in a lack of capital, then the 
government will let the Bank of Japan accept a short - term government debt 
in exchange. If the government is in an excess income position, it wi ll 
reduce the short-term government debt. 
3 . Special account for foreign exchange (the account for foreign 
currency balance). 
If foreign currency increases, foreign exchange banks will sell 
foreign currency to the special accounts . Thus the increase of foreign 
currency in the special account will force the government to sell its 
short-term government debt to the Bank of Japan in order t o offset the 
payment. 
14 
But recently, under the contract of issuing the foreign exchange 
bond, 8 if the government buys foreign currency which goes over the 
limitation, there exists a difficulty of keeping all foreign 
currency in the special account. Since the foreign exchange bank's 
interest rate is higher than the rate of return of operating foreign 
currency, this will put foreign currency stock above a certain degree 
in the special account. The result: the foreign exchange special acc ount 
will sell foreign currency to the Bank of Japan, and the special acc ount 
will buy foreign currency using the capital which was obtained from sell-
ing foreign currency. 
C. Its major and supplementary policies 
Now, we may turn to analyze those major policies of the Bank of Japan 
which I mentioned at the beginning of Section B. 
1. Discount rate policy In general, the standard discount rate 
is represented by the commercial draft discount rate in Japan . g· There 
are two normal effects of changing the discount rate as follows : 
a . Cost effect: An increase in the discount rate will result in a 
higher bank capital cost . This contains the Bank of Japan ' s 
loan which would cause a bank ' s business activi ties to go down . 
8 
9 
For example: 
1 . An increase in the cost to banks borrowing from the Bank of 
Japan will resul t in a decrease in the amount borrowed by 
Short-term government ' s bond . 
It's different from the prime rate in U. S.A. 
15 
banks f rom the Bank of Japan, and so diminish the bank's 
loan to enterprise . 
2 . An increase in the bank's capital cost will result in an 
increase in the bank's loan rate to enterprise in order to 
retain the profit. 
b . Announcement effect: This effect is based upon the psychological 
movements of money market ins t itutions focusing on the announce-
men t of the central banking discount rate policy .
10 
From the s tatistical data11 we can observe that during 1964-1969 the 
discount rate is ve r y low compared t o the bank ' s loan int erest rate to 
enterprise. Moreover, an i nteresting thing to observe is that the call 
ra t e is equal t o or higher than the discount rate. In tight-money 
situations, call rates exceed official rates . This phenomenon is caused 
by the r es tr ic t ion in borrowing from the Bank of Japan at discount rates . 
Clearly we see from the following chart that even though ther e is an 
i ncrease in banks borrow ing from the ca ll marke t, the discount rate pol icy 
will not affect the bank' s borrowing fr om the Bank of Japan as long as the 
call rate is above the discount rate . 
Thus, changes in the discount rate wouldn't have any direct impact on 
banks ' behavior of borrowing. In order t o reduce banks borrowing from the 
Bank of Japan t he Bank of Japan needs t o increase the discount rate to 
apply a t ight -money policy a nd must also increase the l oan i nte r est rate 
at the same time in order t o achieve control of city bank ' s lending . 
101 . 1 t is a so necessary to consider time lag . 
11
see Appendix B. 
16 
Therefore an increase in the discount rate is important to the 
increase in the loan interest rate in Japan . 
We may note here that the banks' loan interest rate may not be the 
decisive factor for granting loans to enterprises, because credit-
rationing is performed a great deal in the Japanese financial system. 
Since the Bank of Japan controls the city bank's loans it forces 
the city bank to acquire loans from the call market if the city bank 
chooses a "little more cost" but "free" money source. 
2. Debt operation (open market operation) The debt operation 
hasn't been successful in the Bank of Japan during the period 1964-1969. 
One of the reasons is the underdevelopment of the capital market. 
Short-term government debt has no circulating market because the 
call rate is larger than the short-term government debt interest rate. 
The transaction of the short-term debt is simply between the Bank of Japan 
and certain enterprise at the fixed rate. Thus there is no way to 
establish a suitable market at that time . 
The Bank of Japan's transaction debts are mainly long-term government 
debts and government guaranteed debts. But these long-term debt trans-
actions are scarce . Most of them are held by the financial institutions. 
They expect the Bank of Japan to buy those bonds at a better pr ice than 
in the circulating market, since they are forced to accept those debts 
by the Central Bank. Therefore, a long-term debt is simply an exchange 
with the Bank of Japan's l oan credit circulated between the Bank of Japan 
and other financial institutions . And, in fact, no market existed for it 
before the early 60's. 
17 
I THE BANK OF JAPAN J 
-~-. 
discount rate 
.....----=-./ 
CITY BANK!------ loan interest rate -----1 ENTERPRISES I 
~ 
call rate 
CALL MARKET 
Ra ise in discount -~~~= ·~ 
I BJ's loaning co~trol strengthened 
Regulation for additional loans call rate t I 
Cit y banks ' loan to enterprises 
Figur e 1.5. Monetary control and the Bank of Japan 
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For convenience, the graph below shows the circulation of the debt 
operation. 
of Japan 
City Bank 
--!..:_11 D 
..__ -----.:::.._ e b t ---- - -·- ------- ;------- ----. 
_ _ -~ ~,___L_o_c_a_l B_ank call money 
Thus, the Bank of Japan's debt operation becomes a buying a ction only 
12 
in the early 60 's when the low interest rate policy was performed. 
D. The rate of reserved fund operat ion 
This is considerably more effective when compared t o the a bove two 
policies since it ' s determined by the law . The only pr ob lem that can 
be argued is whether the finance minister has the right to prove the rate 
of reserve . This also shows the problem of intervention by the govern-
ment of central banking. 
In recent years, the operation is a s f ollows: In tight-money 
situations the rate of reserve is increased and vice versa in easy -money 
cases. But the rate of reserve was low and the fluctuation was small, 
thus the real effect of it had not been reached during the past years. 
The reason for that was because of the different situation between 
city banks and l ocal banks. From the data given in Appendix B, Table B.4, 
we can see that city banks were overdrafted from the Bank of Japan, but 
12 
New development of the capital market will be explained later . 
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local banks had no noticeable loans from the Bank of Japan . Indeed, 
local banks had spare money most of the time. 
Therefore, an increase in the rate of r eserve will substant ially 
influence city banks but will not affect l ocal banks as long as the r e 
is a poor debt operation. Reciprocally, local banks become the supplier 
of ca 11 money . 
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III . THE COMMERCIAL BANKS AND 
BANK- RELATED ENTERPRISES 
A. The commercial banks 
The commercial bank in Japan can be divided into four groups. 
1. City bank 
2 . Local bank 
3 . Foreign exchange bank 
4. Foreign bank 
Since city banks 13 play a vital role in this paper, I am going to 
concentrate on them rather than ent ire commercial banks . 
I n pr incipal, city banks accept demand deposits in orde r t o 
facilit ate the settlemen t of chec1<ing accounts. 
The ro l e they play is to not only reduce the circulation of currency 
but also to use the temporarily isolated capital flow to invest in indus -
trial activities . Moreover, city banks create lending capital by extend -
ing cr edit and br i ng it t o activate the city ' s money-flow operat ion which 
will develop the capital circulation in the society . Thus their social 
responsibilities are quite important . 
From the data given in Appendix B we can observe that city banks 
p layed an extr emely vital role in the Japanese financial system, because 
various governmental policies and the existing economic sit uation encour-
aged them to direct financing to the industries with the full support from 
13
It is defined as " commercia l banks wh ich are in metropolitan cities, 
mainly in Tokyo , Nagoya , Kyoto, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and Hiroshima, but 
exc lude foreign exchange banks " . 
Some local banks changed i nto city banks during this period 
SO ' s - 70's, s uch as Japan Mutual Bank changed into City Bank in 1971 . 
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the Bank of Japan. If we look through th 1~ ir historical movements, we can 
see that their behavior towards the growing ec onomy was really the key 
fac t or to observe in Japanese ec onomic movement s and may force s ome 
potential movements of the ec onomy. We may look at Tables 2 . 1 and 2 . 2 
for a simple comparison between the city banks' principal accounts in 
1961 and 1971. 
There are several points which should be noticed from the data 
provided . 
1. In the debt account, the loans in 1961 were 21 . 2 percent of the 
total deposits and only 3 percent in 1971 . We may notice that 
the government i n 1961 was operating under a low inter est policy . 
The loan was mostly from the Bank of Japan since it was mor e 
liquidable . Therefore, this seems to explain that the city 
banks' overdraft problems were serious fac t ors in 1961 but not 
in 1971 since only 3 percent of the total deposit was the loan . 
Moreover, only 1.7 percent of the loan was from the Bank of Japan . 
2 . A decrease occurred in the per centage of owne d capital against 
total deposits (from 5 . 4 percent down to 1. 4 per cent) . It is 
caused considerably by an exponential i ncrease in the banks ' 
lendings and the restrictions on the distributions of their own 
s t ocks . It seems to point out that even though a restriction on 
their own reserve fund exists , city banks were likely to forget 
their own responsibilities for the guarantee of deposits because 
they be lieved the Bank of Japan would bear most risks from the 
industrial protection plan which was encouraged by the goverrunent 
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at that time. We may notice that the city banks' lending 
f h d . . d . 
14 h . h capacities are grown rom t e e r ivat ive eposit w ic comes 
from the banks' creditableness with full support of the Bank 
of Japan's credit. Indeed, because of the underdevelopment of 
the capital marke t in the early 60's, city banks became the 
major supporter and began to take care of enterprises ' long- term 
fund as well as the short-term fund. Most of the city banks' 
lendings toward enterprises were concentrated by the banks ' f r ee 
discretion15 which encouraged lending compe tit ion among city 
banks. Therefore, a few large scale enterprise s s eemed t o 
receive mos t of the circul ation. At the s ame time, city banks 
accumulated the circulation of huge amounts of depos it through 
h . d d 1 . b. l . f h . d. 16 t ose enterprises an create more r e ia i ity o t eir ere i t. 
On the other hand, because of concentrated inves tment compet i tion, 
enterprises were seeking their cap i tal wh ich was suppl ied only by 
city banks. Hence, the business of e nterprises became a dis -
turbing element toward the s cale of busines s fluctuation. 
From the account of city banks' lend i ng from the centra l bank, we find 
h h 1 · 2 b;ll; on
17 · t at t e year y i ncrement was • • in 1965 and 5 billion in 1970 . 
The reason for this exponential increment wasn ' t only c aused by the fas t 
14The der ivative deposit made higher banks ' profitabilities and bank' s 
lending capac ities . 
15The reason for th i s is the failure of the discount rate policy. 
16see various tables in Appendix B. 
170 . J Y nit: apanese en . 
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growing economy but also by city banks' unclassified pipe lines
18 
h h h d . f. . 19 t roug t e irect inancing. 
Going back to its origin, it was caused by the delayed improve-
ment of enterprises with its capital fulfilled through the bond market. 
Hence, those enterprises ' capitalwere substantially relied on by city 
banks and the degree of dependability was increased every year. Thus 
it ought to be concerned that there exists a certain tightened rela-
tionship between the fast growing economy and the city banks lending . 
Politically, the increment was caused by the l ow-interest rate policy
20 
of the government in the early 60's which ignored the fact that enter -
prises at that time owned only 2 percent of the actual capital against 
tot al deposits . Because of the intervention by the government toward 
central banking, city banks creditableness, which was supported by the 
Bank of Japan's credit, is fully used and developed rapidly. This 
phenomenon also happened to bank- related enterprises. A low discount 
rate and a low tax to the banking finances provided an almost unlimited 
fund supply to t he banks by the government. Of course, unlimited lend-
ings to enterprises also occurred. 
18without considering long- term or short-term f und supply, corranercial 
banks were free to engage in any industrial inves tments . If there is any 
restriction for banks themselves to engage such activities, then they 
wi ll use their connected financial institutions to do the job. 
19 
Because of the complicated Japanese wholesale and retail market 
structure. 
20
Minister Ideda believes that a highly growing economy requires a 
f ull support by government. 
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Table 2 . 1 . City Banks' principal account in 196la 
Assets 
Total Deposit 62, 930 
(100) 
Unit: 100 millions 
Cash (the reserve fund in 
BJ is i ncluded) 
Interbank deposit and 
call loan 
Securities 
Short-term government 
debt 
Long-term government 
debt 
Lendings 
Others 
aSource : (13) . 
11,259 
(17.9) 
360 
(0 . 6) 
5,670 
(15.8) 
90 
(0 . 2) 
55,530 
(88 . 2) 
11, 170 
(17. 8) 
Debt 
Debt 
Loan 
Capital s t ock 
13 ,320 
(21. 2) 
3,380 
(5 . 4) 
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Table 2 . 2 . City Banks ' principal account in 1971a 
Assets 
Cash 
Deposit 
Call l oan 
Securities 
Di scount draft 
Lendings 
d 
Foreign exchange 
account 
Others 
as ource : ( 13) . 
Total Deposit 314 , 308 
(100) 
Unit: 100 millions 
29,820 
(9 .4)c 
6 ,293 
(2 . 0) 
720 
(0 . 2) 
48,402 
(15 . 4) 
79,532 
(25.3) 
188, 964 
(60 . 1) 
21,669 
(7. 0) 
61,117 
(20 . 0) 
Loan 
b Deb t 
Cal l money 
For e i gn exchange 
account 
Capital 
Others 
b 
Loan from the Bank of Japan was 5,386 (1 .7 ) in debt account . 
cNwnbers shown in parentheses are the percentage against t ota l 
deposit . 
dDraft !endings 162,281 was included in !endings . 
9 , 212 
(3 . 0) 
15 ,370 
(5 . O) 
12 '920 
(4 . 1) 
4 , 518 
(1 .4) 
80 ,189 
(25 .5) 
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If we look over t he city banks ' lending cont ents, we f i nd that mos t 
of them are concentrated on a few large enterprises . As ment ione d befor e, 
d b k 1
. 21 
t he t e ndency was caused by the management of t he mixe an po icy. 
Cit y banks ' !endings are especially concentrated on safe and exce llent 
credit owners (such as large enterprises) and credi t is ex amined care-
fu l ly on those enterpr ises. This selective lending is ident ica l t o the 
c r edit rationing described in a later chapter. In t he de ta i l s shown on 
city banks ' lending, draft lending is more proport iona t e t han commer cial 
drafts ' discount . Commercia l drafts ' discount diminished f r om the Bank 
of Japan's loan and import draft of settlement or export pre - lending draft, 
etc . are treated as draft lending . The contents for those draft ! endings 
mos t ly are fixed long term investment for accommodat i on . Pract ica lly, 
t he amount of investment for accommodation shou ld abs or b f r om i ssuing 
bond and debent ure in nature. But the underdevelopment of the ca pi t al 
market has caused enterprises to depend on city banks' i n abs orbing their 
acconunodation fund. 
Furthermore, other funds would have been used for a ccommodat ion. The 
fund actually invested for the purpose of accommodation sh ould have been 
more proportionate than the amounts shown in the statist i ca l data. 
The basis for city banks ' expansion was the h uge amount of per sonal 
savings which were caused by the fast-growing econ omy . 22 
21M. d b k 1 . 1 b ixe an po icy means t at a commercial ank can operate not only 
a short - term finance but also a long-term finance a s wel l . 
22
More specifically, the existence of the h uge amount s of excess 
distribution of government funds, caused by the exponential econ omic 
development. 
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If we consider the actual personal deposit's increment in a year, 
1957 was 0.5 billion, 1965 was 2.5 billion and 1970 was 4 . 7 billion. 
23 
Indeed, those deposits included many long-term deposits . It's quite 
different from other developing countries. Reciprocally, it did emphasize 
the failure of the capital market. 
The net profit for city banks is not known, since there is no 
standard calculation for it. But we may examine their gross profits and 
24 
costs in order to find out what their net profit would roughly look like. 
First of all, the interest rate on deposits is limited by the Bank 
f J I ·a l" 25 o apan s gu1 e 1ne. On the other hand, the increase in lending and the 
bond rate will be the main item for these growing banks profit . Of course, 
the most important factor is the low and established interest rate of 
deposit and the Bank of Japan's le.an. Thus, the banks' profit will be 
influenced by the difference between the rate of interest of lending and 
deposit. For profit maximization, city banks need only to increase their 
capacities in business circles t11rough pipe 1 ine activities, as long as 
there exists an excess demand of funds. The larger city banks get, the 
more profit they gain. Subsequently, the profit which city banks ' earned 
from the currency operation has been a conditional parameter of efficiency 
in banking management. Therefore, the gross profit of city banks is com-
bined with the profit from currency operation and the profit from the 
credit supply . 
23
Long-term deposit makes the suggestion to let city banks go into 
the long-term investment plan. 
24
Gross profit (lending interest+ bond interest); Cost (deposit 
interest+ loan interest+ outlay). 
251 . 1 t contains severa . 
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IL The re lat innsh ip between city banks and 1 oca l hanks 
If we look over Appendix B, one of the crucial things we may notice 
is the existence of local banks. Their financial movements are very 
close to city banks. 
Compared to local banks, other financial institutions except city 
banks have no significance for the analysis in this paper. Thus, its 
desirable not to discuss their movements except by necessity. 
Now we turn to study the role that local banks play in the paper. 
The role local banks play is quite different from one which city 
banks play, because, city banks were and are demaoders of the Bank of 
Japan's loan. But local banks were and are the supplier of call money. 
Indeed, local banks do not receive the Bank of Japan's loans which makes 
them free to act as the call money suppliers, They earn their profit 
through call market and sometimes earn profit from interbank financing 
to city banks. 
Because of the geographical disadvantages, local banks' deposit 
seemed to decline compared to city banks. But there is independence in 
local banks conce;ning the nank of Japan's restrictions and adherence to 
overborrowing enterprises. In fact, local banks have their healthy bank-
ing structures such as balanced financing to all kinds of encerprises 
without concentrated investment. Certainly, because of its independence 
from the Bank of Japan's credit and loan, the effective central banking 
policies toward local banks or other related banks are quite questionable. 
The only relationship that exists between the Bank of Japan and local 
banks is the transaction of government debt. Since the circulation of 
29 
those debt operations does seem to be well worked out , t he Bank of J apan 
still can't reach its control to those local banks . 
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IV. BANK-RELATED ENTERPRISES 
A. Its structure and the role it plays 
There are many data provided by the Bank of Japan's statistical 
lab to indicate that the Japanese financial system is become more 
systematized than ever before . More specifically, enterprises to which 
were loaned 20 percent of bank-owned capital in 1973 were as follows: 
Mitsui group: Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Products Comi:•any 
Mitsubishi group: Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trading Company 
Sumitomo group: Sumitomo Bank, Ito-chu Trading Company, Sumitomo 
Tr ad ing Company 
Fuji group: Fuji Bank, Mitsui Products Company, Marumemi Company 
Daiichi group: Daiichi Kangyo Bank, Itochu Trading Company, 
Mitsubishi Trading Company 
Sanwa group: Sanwa Bank, Nissho Iwai Trading Company 
Tokai group: Tokai Bank, Mitsubishi Trading Company, Tomen Company, 
Mitsubishi Trading Company. 
From the yearly report of the statistical bureau of the Bank of 
Japan, the first listed companies are 746 excluding financial institu-
tions. 
Concerning the proportion of loaning and the mutual exchange of 
26 
stocks, 60 percent out of 746 companies which qualified as large enter-
prises are systematized in the above six groups . 
26 See Tab le D.l in Appendix D. 
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Tracing back to the early 60's, the enterprises' capital mostly 
depended on banks' borrowings, but not collecting, through public bond 
market or by issuing their stocks. 
As mentioned in the previous section, this phenomenon was caused by 
two major factors. 
1. The central bank's low interest rate policy. 
2. Underdevelopment of the capital market . 
These were the first steps toward their systematized structures. 
Since then, even though there was partial development of the capital 
market and reformed central banking policies, systematized structures 
have been built up . The financial chain between city banks and enter-
prises is exclusively tightened. There were several reasons for this. 
The main reason was that the investment competition between large 
enterprises became the competition between their systematized city banks . 
The attitudes of city banks toward the investment competition seriously 
obstructed central banking policies.
27 
Indeed, there was an excess 
28 
circulation of money flow throughout 1970-1973 which was caused by the 
continuous surplus of international balance in Japan, during which period 
most large enterprises made large profits.
29 
It provided many opportuni-
ties for them to improve their own capital proportionate to their total 
assets . In reality, the spare money was not returned to city banks but 
was reinvested in bond and land purchases . It is interesting to observe 
2 7Th h 1 . . 11 b d h h e w o e interpretation wi e presente in t e next c apter. 
28I . d b h f t is cause y t e enormous increase in oreign currency. 
29see Appendix B. 
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that since city banks did not prefer enterprises to pay money back in 
order to tighten their relations with them, it was also more profitable 
if they kept it that way. If city banks received those returning funds 
it would decrease the amount of loans shown in its property account. The 
Bank of Japan would try to absorb them up to certain appropriate degree.
30 
Besides investments in land and bonds some large enterprises did 
finance some middle or small enterprises with spare money. It seemed to 
form another systematized structure in the whole business cir cle. Of 
course, this relation can not be determined numerically through the exist -
ing public statistical data or by the Bank of Japan's published data . But 
it can be analyzed by the derivation of this special economic structure, 
where the pipe lines are really complicated in both their wholesale and 
retail aspects. If the share of some profitable field can not be con-
trolled by those large enterprises, they will try to absorb those enter-
prises which histor ically shared the field. Once they got into part of 
it, they most of the time get all of it . 
If we look over the constitution of enterprises' financial assets, 
we will find that the property of trust, insurance and bonds are only 
one-fifth or one-fourth of the whole. Indeed, it is stabilized in that 
way despite the tone of the market. On the other hand, personal financial 
assets increased fifteen times from 1954 to 1969 . Saving deposits were 
60 percent to 70 percent against total deposits before 1964. Bonds were 
only about 20 percent before 1964 and onl y 10 percent in 1965 . 
30 
Because the Bank of Japan concerns its effecting power toward city 
banks. 
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For enterprises, their assets' constitution was more than 60 per-
cent f r om outside capital . Own capital proportions were going down every 
year. It was only 10 percent to 20 percent in the 60's . Of course, we 
also shouldn't ignore that between large enterprises and their satellite 
enterprises, or between large enterprises and their systematized city 
banks, there exists a mutual bearing of stocks. If we subtracted this 
figure31 then the actual proportion of self- owned capital will be much 
lower. Included in the outside capital, only a small proportion is made 
of debts and long-term loans and most of it is occupied by short-term 
loans. 
B. The horizontal and vertical integrations of city banks 
From the following tables, we may see that there exists various 
complicated structures for the whole business circle . 
From Table 3.1, we can easily see that most city banks, trust banks 
and insurance companies are closely related t o six major systematized 
financial groups. It shows the horizontal integrations of city banks . 
From Tables 3.2 through 3.5, we can see that city banks supplied their 
capital not only by direct financing to enterprises but also supplied 
money through their satellite companies. This shows the vertical integra-
tion of city banks. 
There are no statistics which can be obtained concerning the degree 
of those financial groups' expansion into the business circle. Even so, 
we can infer that the degree of the expansion into the business circle 
31 
Of course, it can't actually be subtracted since there is no such 
data provided. 
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would be enormous. Mor eover, the legal or illega l political contribu-
tions from those financ i a l groups would also effect the governmental 
policies a s well as the centra l banking policies . 
Table3.l. 
a 
The r atio of f inancing in major financial systems 
High Ranked Company 
Financial Institutions No. of Co . 
The ratio 
of Finance 
Mitsubishi Group 
Mitsubishi Bank 
Mi t subishi Trust Bank 
Meiji Life Ins . Co . 
Tokyo Marine Ins . Co . 
Mitsui Group 
Mitsui Bank 
Mitsui Trust Bank 
Mitsui Li fe Ins . Co . 
Taisho Marine Ins . Co . 
Sumitomo Gr oup 
Sumitomo Bank 
Sumitomo Trust Bank 
Sumitomo Life Ins. Co . 
Sumit omo Marine I ns. Co. 
Fuji Group 
Fuji Bank 
Yasuda Trust Bank 
Yasuda Life Ins . Co. 
Yasuda Marine Ins . Co . 
Da iichi Group 
Daiichi Bank 
Asahi Bank 
As ahi Life Ins. Co . 
Sanwa Gr oup 
Sanwa Bank 
Toyo Trust Bank 
Daido Life Ins. Co . 
a Source: (3) . 
85 34 . 89io 
79 24 . 18 
80 34 .37 
78 26 . 28 
41 20.63 
53 28. 93 
Second Ranked Company 
The ratio 
No . of Co . of Finance 
53 44 . 00% 
46 37 . 47 
36 31.26 
68 31 . 53 
27 28.71 
23 39 . 39 
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Table 3 . 2 . 
a Bank - related lease industry ' s company 
Date of 
Bank Lease Co . Establishment 
Fuji Fuyo Sogo Leas e Co . April 1969 
Sumitomo Sogo Lease Co . Sept. 1968 
Sanwa Orient Lease Co. April 1964 
Da iwa Orient Lease Co . April 1964 
Kobe Orient Lease Co. April 1964 
Tokai Central Lease Co . May 1969 
Daiichi Central Leasing System July 1969 
Kangyo Tokyo Lease Co . Aug. 1964 
Ky ow a Showa Lease Co. April 1969 
Fudosan Showa Lease Co. April 1969 
Universal Lease Co . April 1969 
Nihon-Kogyo Univer s a l Lease Co. Dec . 1969 
a Source: (18) . 
Table 3 .3. a Bank -related c r edit card company 
Japan Diners Club 
Japan Credit Bureau 
Diamond Credit Co . 
Sumitomo Credit 
Service Co . 
Million Card Service 
Co . 
Union Credit Co . 
aSource: (18) . 
Date of 
Esta blishment 
Dec. 1960 
Jan . 1961 
Dec. 1967 
Dec . 1967 
April 1968 
J une 1969 
Capital 
(Unit: 100 
million yen) 
1.0 
6 . 0 
2.0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
1.8 
(unit: 
Fuji 
Capital 
100 mill. yen) 
LO 
L 0 
4 . 5 
4.5 
4.5 
LO 
5 . 0 
2. 0 
1.2 
1.2 
0 . 5 
5 . 0 
Related 
banks 
Sanwa, Mitsui, Kobe 
Ky ow a 
Mitsubishi 
Sumitomo 
Tokai 
Da iichi Kangyo, Fuji 
Saitama, Ta iyo, 
Mitsubishi 
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Table 3.4. 
a Bank- related information industry's company 
Date of Ca pita l 
Bank Company Es t ablishment (Unit : 100 mill i on) 
Dai ichi Daiichi Kangyo 
Kangyo Bank Management Center Dec . 1967 
Century Research Center Oct . 1971 
Fuji Bank Fuyo I n formation Center May 1970 
Fuji National City 
Consulting Co . July 1970 
Mitsubishi Diamond Computer Service July 1970 
Sumi t omo Nihon Information 
Bank Service Feb . 1969 
Sumitomo Business 
Consulting Co. Mar . 1971 
Sanwa Bank Toyo Computer Service Mar. 1967 
aSour ce: (18) . 
Table 3 . 5 . Bank- r ela ted house-financing companya 
Company 
Nihon House Finan-
cing Co. 
House Loan Service 
House Coordinate 
Center 
Mutua l Bank House-
Loan Center 
aSour ce : (2) . 
Establishment 
J une 1971 
Sept. 1971 
Oct . 1971 
July 1972 
Capital 
(Unit: 
100 million) 
7.38 
6.00 
5.00 
5.00 
0 . 5 
5 . 0 
5.0 
0 . 8 
0 . 5 
2 . 0 
2.0 
5 . 0 
Major Stock 
Holders 
Kyowa , Kobe, Sanwa, 
Chiba, Toyo Trus t , 
Hokutaku, Mitsui, Mitsui 
Trust, Yokohama 
Fuji, Mitsubishi, 
Daiichi Kangyo, Saitama , 
Taiyo, Takai 
Mitsui, Mi t subishi, 
Sumitomo , Yasuda , Toyo, 
Chuo 
Mutual Banks 
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V. TWO STAGES FOR 11 0VERDRAIT 11 PROBLEM 
A. The "overdraft" def in it ion and measurement 
For the special character of the Japanese financial system, 
Japanese economists usually called it "overloan" rather than "overdraft". 
The definition for it is rather difficult , because it is defined in 
many ways by various economists. Nevertheless, most economists seem to 
agree with the fol lowing definition: "Banks, especially city banks, are 
in overdrafted situation to their undertakings; and the resulting finan-
cial difficulty was compensated by the borrowings from the central bank 
(The Bank of Japan). 11 In other words, we may define "overdraft" as 
"bank 1 s excess credit over a long period which is mainly depended on the 
debt from the Bank of Japan ." 
The measurement for "overdraft" is again rather a difficult one. 
Basically, we may consider it through the degree of the ratio between 
loan and deposit in Table 4.1 . But it's not possible for us to define 
wh ich part of the ratio will be met f rom the "overdraft" phenomenon. 
However , we may measure banks ' owned reserve, which is defined as follows: 
Banks ' owned reserve= cash+ deposit at the Bank of Japan - loan from 
the Bank of Japan. 
Then overdrafted condition can be observed when banks' owned re-
serve is negative. 
More specifically, owned reserve can also be expressed into the 
following measurement. 
Owned reserve = cash - ~heck and draft + deposit +call loan) - (loan 
+ call money). 
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Tab le 4 .1 lists the owned reserve statistics during 1954- 64 , ba sed 
upon t he above formula . 
Table 4 . 1. 
a The balance sheet for owned reserve, 1954-1964 
Year City Bank Local Bank 
Unit: One million yen 
1954 First half - 3,333 279 
Second half - 2,343 453 
1955 First half - 1,578 528 
Second half 987 759 
1956 Firs t half - 1,684 659 
Second half - 3,336 758 
1957 First half - 5,595 777 
Second half - 6 , 210 958 
1958 Firs t half - 5 , 858 1,181 
Second half - 4 , 751 1,109 
1959 First half - 5,488 1 ,361 
Second half - 5,863 1,493 
1960 First half - 6,027 1,875 
Second half - 6,634 1,511 
1961 First half -10,310 1,844 
Second half -12,412 1,883 
1962 First half -15,579 2,338 
Second half -13,998 2,503 
1963 First half -14 ,450 3,020 
Second half -14 , 592 3,219 
1964 First half -19,488 3 , 791 
Second half -20 ,002 4 ' 180 
8source: (13) . 
Cl early, there was always a negative owned reserve exis ting between 
1954-1964. So the overdraft phenomenon can be identified during these 
year s . 
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We may turn to see how the overdrafted situation can damage the 
central banking policies. 
In general, an "overdraft" situation exists. It means there is a 
deficiency in city banks' reserves. This results in pressure from the 
Bank of Japan to increase their reserves. In order to diminish the 
pressure from the Bank of Japan, city banks will turn to get call loans 
from the call market for additional reserves, in order to meet the Bank 
of Japan's requirement on reserve funds. Obviously, such action taken by 
city banks will result in an increase in the call rate , since there is 
an increase in demand for call money. If the increase in call rate 
offsets the increase in long-term interest rate, then there exists a 
difficulty for money flow to get into the debt market. Then the short-
t erm financial market becomes an investment market and the interest rate's 
adjustment toward money supply and demand is weakened. It causes limita-
tion to the market operation and the rate of reserve fund operation. 
Finally, it will force the Bank of Japan's financial policy to be only a 
lending policy. 
If we look at Table 4.3, it indicates that despite a stabilized ratio 
of lendings, the "overdraft" from the Bank of Japan decreased substan-
tially in 1971 and 1972. In the meantime, there was also a decrease in 
the ratio of external debt but not so substantially decreased compared 
to the ratio of the Bank of Japan's loan. That is because some of the 
debt which decreased from the Bank of Japan had gone to other money 
suppliers, especially from the call market. 
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Tab le 4 . 2 . The r atio of loan against total de~osit during 19S4- 1962, 
be tween ci t y banks and local banks 
Year City Bank Loca l Bank 
% % 
S4 9S . 1 83.0 
SS 78.6 81.2 
S6 75 . 4 79 . 2 
S7 84.2 80.3 
58 82 . 0 78 . 2 
59 8S.3 78 . 9 
60 84.7 78 . 9 
61 86 . 9 79 . S 
62 90.7 78.9 
aSource: (24) . 
Table 4.3 . The indicator for city banks' "overdraft" phenomenon, 
1960- 1972. a 
Year 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
6S 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
Ratio ofb Ratio of Ratio of the Ban~ 
Lendings External Debtc of Japan 's Loan 
% % % 
98 14 8 
103 22 18 
105 22 16 
102 19 12 
104 21 9 
99 19 9 
97 17 10 
99 16 8 
96 15 8 
97 16 8 
99 18 9 
93 8 2 
93 8 s 
a Source: (24). 
bThe ratio of !endings = 
lendings 
actual deposit + debt issued 
cThe ratio of external debt 
_ credit money + call money - call loan 
- a ctua l deposit + debt issued + loan + call money - call loan 
dThe ratio of the Bank of Japan's l oan 
= the Bank of J apan's l oan 
actual deposit +debt issued +the Bank of Japan ' s loan 
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B. A brief introduction to the capital market and the call market 
1 . The capital market The existing capital market in Japan is 
mainly divided into public bond market, long-term deposit market, long-
term lending market and consumption housing financing markets . 
I pointed out that there was a partially developed capital market 
in the previous chapter where I was talking about the development of the 
stock market and the discount draft market. The debt market is still 
facing a lot of difficulty of the following nature: 
First of all, the Japanese stock market started in 1949. In 1969, 
its trading amounts became the second in the world. It seemed to be 
operating very stably in Japan. The scale for it isn't big enough to 
influence the tendency of the economy. That is because the cost f or 
capital absorption in the way of issuing bonds is considerably more 
expens ive than the cost for capital abs orption through banks' borrowing. 
Thus, the Bank of Japan supplies f unds through the stock market in order 
to circulate bond and debt transactions . 
Secondly, the most crucial issue of the Japanese capital market was 
the underdevelopment of the debt market, because it i nfluenced both 
monetary and fiscal policies. The failure of the market in the early 60's 
deeply disturbed the Japanese financial organization while the economy was 
growing very fast. The debt operation first started in 1956, and was 
operating substantially in 1966. 
How it failed was because most debt transactions were between 
financial institutions. The seller was mainly city banks and the buyer 
was mainly loca l banks and other middle-small financial i nstitutions 
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which held spare money . Thus, concerning money flow circulation, the 
debt circulating market is just playing the same role as the call market. 
Debts wh ich are dealt in the market were mostly financial debts and 
industrial debts . Government debts, local debts and government guaran-
teed debts' transactions were scarce . Especially, the issued government 
debts mostly went t o financial institutions. The Bank of Japan absorbed 
them through open market operation, so that the amount of the government 
debt held by financial institutions wouldn 't increase. Thus financial 
institutions wouldn't have to sell government debts to others. The 
amounts of government debt t ransactions are still small even though the 
amount of government debt i s large. Because of the governmenta l policy, 
the financ ial institutions (mainly city banks) are forced to accept those 
government debts and government guaranteed debts. However, those debts 
will be abs orbed by the Bank of Japan. So there is no necessity for 
them t o sell those debts. There was an increase in the amount of debt 
held by individuals . But most debts such as industrial debts a nd finan-
cia l debts are still mainly held by financial institutions . 
Financial institutions would buy newly issued debts if they had 
spare money. I n a tight money situation, those financial institutions 
who have no spare money would rather take a slight loss to sell debts to 
the other financial institutions who have spare money . Obvious ly , those 
financia l institutions without spare money are mainly city banks and 
those who have spare money are mainly local banks or long - term financial 
institutions . 
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Finally, the discount draft market was established in 1970 in order 
to meet the emergency expansion of the Bank of Japan's debt operation 
through the highly developed economy. The success of the market really 
led to real open market operat ions . 
2 . Call marke t The call market is quite important, since it's 
the main money supplier of the financial institutions other than the 
Bank of Japan to city banks. 
Call money in the market is supplied by financial i nst itutions , 
mainly local banks, trust banks, and mutual financing banks. Call loans 
are mostly demanded by city banks. 
The uniqueness existing in this market is the phenomenon that the 
call rate is never lower than the discount rate in the Japanese economy . 
Consider the normal situation where the discount rate ~ call rate ~ 
32 
short-term government debt. This means banks wil l either supply call 
money into the call market or buy short-term government debt or 
securities in order to meet their payment. When in tight money situa-
tions, they can sell these things above in order t o collect their 
capital . If, indeed, the collected capital is still not enough, 
they will be forced to borrow from the central bank at a higher interest 
rate . 
32The reas on for keeping call rate ~short -rerrn government debt is 
that if a call rate is lower than short-term government debt, then the 
money suppl ier in the financial institution will buy short-term govern-
ment debt, since it's more profitable and rel i ab le . Thus, call money 
will be scarce . 
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But in fact, city banks in Japan have no i ntent ion of keeping 
their reserves up to a certain appropriate degree since they c onsider 
the risk bearing will be shared by the Bank of Japan and it's more 
profitable to maximize their lending to large enterprises . Thus, in 
order to maximize their lending capacities, they borrow from call market 
and the Bank of Japan technically. 
The reason f or call rate ~discount rate was because call loans had 
become the source of city banks' short-term lendings and also for use o f 
the city banks' reserve payment. 
C. Two-stage analysis 
Now, we may t urn t o approach a simple analys is using various facts 
which are presented in the paper and the interpretations which I made 
from various aspects of the statistical data in order to clarify the 
relationships among those financial institutions, especially the central 
bank, city banks, local banks and related financial markets. 
For the convenience of the analysis, I divided the period of those 
financial movements into two stages . The fi rst stage was focusing on 
the period where the low interest policy was performed. The sec ond stage 
was mainly concentrated on the inflow of a large amount of excess foreign 
currency which was caused by the big surplus of international ba l ance in 
1971-1972. 
There are four f actors in the first stage. 
1 . The Bank of Japan's interdependency with the government; 
2. Governmental policy (the low interest rate policy); 
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3. City banks' "overdraft" from the Bank of Japan; 
4 . Enterprises' overborrowings. 
The basis for the second stage was really caused by the low interest 
rate policy in the early 60's in the first stage . 
From Figure 4.1, we can see the degree of mutual intervention on 
financia l support. 
First of all, the government, at that time, believed that in order 
t o have a fast-growing economy, full support from the government was 
33 needed. 
Thus, the performance of the low i nterest rate policy34 led most 
financial institutions , especially city banks, to act ivate their lend -
i ngs toward the enterprises by the Bank of Japan's loan at l ow discount 
rate . Both the call market and the capital market's money flow were 
not very active . 
Thus, under the full support from city banks, both large and middle-
small enterprises in cities were fully operated even over their capaci-
ties of business on many fields including export. The growth of l arge 
enterprises, the close relationship between city banks and enterprises 
and city banks "overdraft" from the Bank of J apan were substantially 
established at this time, which real ly form the basis for the Japanese 
financial system. 
33
r n fact, without considering the failure of the good financial 
system, the policy did result in the Japanese economy growing very f ast. 
One of the reasons f or the success was becau se the economy , which had 
not been noticeable before , broke into the international level in 1964 . 
34
Tax reduction on enterprises investment on acc ommodations is 
also included. 
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(Low 
I GOVERNMENT 
I Interest Rate Policy) 
ls 
THE BANK OF 
s 
government debt 
// I DEBT MARKET 1-- -- -~ -- - ~I C~T_: 
s 
LARGE ENTERPRISES 
w 
BANK 1 
~ 
low interest rate (discount rate) 
~r-=--LOCA-L BANK~, 
N 
CALL MARKET 
LEGEND: MIDDLE-SMALL ENTERPRISES 
s = The degree of influence is strong 
N = The degree of influence is normal 
w = The degree of influence is weak 
u =The degree of influence is uncertain 
Figure 4.1. The relationships among government, financial institutions 
and ·~nterprises in the first stage 
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We may switch to the second stage to see what happened to the 
phenomenon wh ich occurred in the first stage. There are four factors in 
this stage. 
1. The Bank of Japan's interdependence with the government; 
2. City banks' "overdraft" from the call market; 
3. City banks' interdependence with the enterprises; 
a. credit rationing by city banks 
b. mutual exchange of stocks between city banks and the 
financial groups; 
4. The relationship between the powerful financial groups and the 
government . 
Because of the improvement in the economic growth and the expansion 
of foreign trade, the Japanese economy broke into the international 
market. The governmental policy toward the financial system was 
dramatically changed in a liberal manner to meet the international level 
and a better financial system which has been criticized constant ly since 
the decampment of the government which had the low interest rate policy. 
From Figure 4.2, we can observe that the relationships among those 
financial institutions and enterprises did change but didn't get better 
in the way of a healthy financial system. 
In the second half of 1971 and the first half of 1972, there was 
an enormous increase in the amounts of foreign currency, which was 
caused by profitable foreign trade. 
N 
THE CAPITAL MARKET 
(including discount 
draft, debt and 
stock) 
N 
s 
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GOVERNMENT 
s 
w w 
CITY BANK LOCAL BANK 
s s 
MIDDLE-SMALL ENTERPRISES ~~'----------------l THE CALL MARKET 
Figure 4.2. The relationships among government, financial institutions 
and enterprises in the sec ond stage 
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The phenomenon35 seemed to solve city banks' "overdraft" from the 
Bank of Japan for the time being. But actually on the one hand there 
was a substantial decrease of city banks' debt in the Bank of Japan's 
loan but on the other hand, there still was a substantial city bank 
debt in the call market. Two reasons can explain this matter: 
1. In order to meet the competition among financial groups, city 
banks wanted to keep their excess money fl ow. 
36 
2. Considering the unity of the financial group, city banks did 
not request enterpr ises t o return their lendings since it was 
37 not profitable to do so. The profits which enterprises 
obtained from the profitable exports were simply re-invested 
in many profitable bus inesses such as land and stock investment. 
Indeed, city banks used their creditableness and followed the good 
tone of the market. They again kept their debt in the call market and 
the discount draft market for a better relation between the suppliers 
of call money and themselves. 
From Figure 4.3, we can see the structure for the s o-cal led 
"financial group" . 
The horizontal integrations of city banks are those financial 
institutions such as trust banks and insurance companies. Besides their 
general responsibilities, their policies are mostly parallel t o the city 
banks' policies. 
35
secause city banks took care of most foreign trade. Thus the 
amount of foreign currency inflow resulted in excess money circulation 
in city banks . 
36 Except for those turns t o the Bank of Japan's l oan. In order to 
relax the Bank of Japan's restrictions toward them. 
37The reason has been explained in a previous chapter . 
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Figure 4.3 . The mechanism of financial groups in recent years 
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The vertical integrat ions are (a ) other small financ ial inst i t u-
tions which provided many di f ferent forms of money flow or cred i t 
supply in the business circle f or which c ity banks can not serve 
directly; (b ) large enterprises wh ich wer e s urr ounded by many of their 
satellite enterprises iu many major industr i es . The role that those 
satell i te enterprises play is s imply as a camouflage of their multi-
approaches toward the same kind of i ndustr i es seemingl y f or the pre-
vention of monopoly, and sometimes, because of the polit i cal c ons i dera-
tions toward the communist c ountries. 
Finally, considering the financial groups as a whole, the govern-
mental intervention.l3has bec ome very common in the c ountry . The 
derivation of the governmenta l i ntervent ion by the financial groups 
could have become a disaster for the central bank which is so dependent 
on the government . 
38Ma . 1 1. . 1 . b . in y, po 1t1ca contr1 ut1ons toward the genera l election and 
government officers. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The main idea of this paper is to present the basic understanding 
of the Japanese financial system. Thus, the introduction of each 
individual financial institution is needed. 
Chapter I, describes the role and the system for the Bank of Japan 
following the movement of the amendment of the law of the Bank of Japan. 
It showed the linked relationship between the government and the 
bank which so strongly affected the smoothness of the reform in the law 
of the Bank of Japan. The resulting situation showed the strange 
phenomenon that 55 percent of the whole central bank's capital is 
financed by the government. Without any explanation, the whole system 
inside the bank appears to be just part of the governmental institutions . 
Next, I turned to describing the general role which the central 
bank played and used this to explain the major financial policies al ong 
with the existence of the interdependence with the government. This 
should give a basic understanding of central banking and related 
policies. 
The city banks' behavior and the positions in which they stood 
relative to the central bank under the "overdraft " situation, and the 
related movement of other financial institutions, especially local banks, 
is also introduced in Chapter II. 
To the best of my knowledge, the important contribution of the thesis 
is the disclosure of the existence of the financial gr oup which includes 
systematized financial institutions and systematized enterprises . This 
disclosure is presented in Chapter III. 
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The original reason for their growth was caused by the low interest 
rate policy in the early 60's. 
The more basic reason for the growth was caused by the mutually 
inclusive relationships. 
These financial groups are the major disturbing factors in the 
Japanese central banking. The contents of these financial groups are 
precisely introduced by either vertical or horizontal integrations in 
this chapter. 
Chapter IV combines all the facts which I have introduced in 
previous chapters, in order t o clarify the problem of "overdraft" and 
its results. 
I divided the stages into two major parts. The purpose here was to 
analyze two different financial systems and policies through two time 
periods of interest. 
As a necessary part of the analysis, the capital and the call 
market are also i ntroduced in this chapter. 
Thus, we may conclude that this is a basic study of the Japanese 
financial system during the 60's and 70's. The governmental interven-
tions in the central bank had resulted in an "overdraft" condition for 
city banks and the "overborrowing" condit ion for enterprises, especially 
in the early 60's . Because of the expansions of city banks and enter-
prises, in the later 60's and early 70's, the relation between city 
banks and enterprises have been tightened. The financial gr oups have 
been built up by the over-competition of both city banks and enterprises 
in many industrial areas. 
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Thus, city banks as well as some financial institutions became 
part of the financia l groups. 
Because the large proportion of the economy was dependent on 
export, the financial groups, including city banks and several of the 
enterprises, are getting bigger and bigger. This phenomenon was and 
is happening now in Japan. 
We can conclude that their political influences toward the 
government as well as toward the central banking are significant. 
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IX . APPENDIX A: THE DATA CONCERNING THE 
BANK OF JAPAN 
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Table A .1. Substantial capital banance of the Bank 
1960 to 1972 (Unit, 100 million yen) a 
of J apan during 
FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
General Food Foreign New 
Control Exchange Long-term 
Bank Cap ita l Government 
Year Note Total Bond Others 
60 2,003 51 -2,659 323 2 ,387 -181 
61 2, 171 -4 ,909 - 2, 725 25 -2,209 - 543 
62 2,343 2,033 - 118 538 1,613 -719 
63 2,465 614 580 69 -35 - 238 
64 2,475 4,394 2,960 1,379 55 -1 ,654 
65 2,580 2,662 2 ,073 1,609 65 -1,085 -275 
66 3,635 - 2,220 2,218 2,615 -397 -6,656 - 1 ,443 
67 4,618 -752 484 5 ,235 -655 -5 ,816 -1 ,527 
68 5,306 3,478 -1,763 5,477 4,434 - 4,670 -2,536 
69 6 ,895 1,312 -3,48 1 4,333 4,286 -3,826 -2 ,362 
70 6,490 - 1,447 -7 ,077 2,047 6, 755 -3' 172 -2 '960 
71 7, 114 30 ,282 - 3, 771 - 331 43,556 - 9 ,172 - 1,261 
72 15 ,350 474 -2, 184 1,690 17,870 -16,902 788 
aSource: (12 and 24) . 
60 
Table A. l. Continued . 
The Bank of J apan's Credit 
Lending De ht Short- Short-term 
Ba lance Term Government 
Reserve Debt Debt 
Year Deposit Total Balance Ba l ance Others 
60 -73 2,206 2 , 205 1 
61 - 602 8,225 6 , 860 1,365 
62 286 743 122 621 
63 -1,233 3,322 - 1,520 4,842 
64 552 -817 1 ,346 - 2 , 163 
65 -927 1,120 2,975 - 1 ,855 
66 597 6,701 930 5 ,624 147 
67 - 893 7,790 - 1,371 8,850 311 
68 272 4 , 092 -169 4 , 098 163 
69 -1, 855 9 ,800 4,269 4, 526 908 97 
70 - 56 7 11,464 4,385 8,102 1,525 - 3 , 000 45 2 
71 -227 -2 1, 680 -17,780 -1, 501 -2 ,433 3,000 -2,966 
72 - 6,412 - 20,499 -10, 795 - 135 9 , 842 
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Table A.3 . The distribution of the Bank of Japan ' s property 
(1956-l962)a 
Lendings b Gold and 
Year To Prjvate Foreign Currency 
"lo i'o 
56 12.7 23.4 
57 62 . 0 8 . 3 
58 55 . l 11. 9 
59 42 . 8 19.3 
60 39 . 8 23.0 
61 71. 0 21.6 
62 80.4 15.4 
aSource : (24). 
bLend ings included foreign exchange lendings. 
cGovernment debt included governmental lending. 
dUnit i s the percentage against total property . 
Governmentc 
Bond 
% 
57.0 
22 .5 
22.8 
31.5 
32.3 
2 . 9 
1.3 
Others 
% 
6 . 9 
7 . 2 
10.2 
6 . 4 
4 .9 
4.5 
2.9 
Table A.4. a The principle account of the Bank of Japan in the end of 1962 
Debt Assets 
Unit : 100 million yen 
Bank Note 
Financ i.al Institution's 
Deposit 
Governmental Deposit 
17,460 
(100%) b 
200 
(1. 2%) 
Gold and Foreign Currency 
Reser ve 
Lendings in Cities 
Government Debt 
(inc luded government 
lending) 
7,840 
(16 .3%)b 
12 ,850 
(73.6%) 
3,780 
(21. 77..) 
aS ource: (24) . 
b 
Numbers i n parentheses are the percentage against the total amount 
of bank note . 
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Table A. 5 . The statist ics of debt operation between 1960 to 1964a 
Year City Bank Local Bank 
Unit: 100 million yen 
60 excess buying 3 .4 0 . 6 
61 excess buying 1, 061. l 250 . 4 
62 excess buying 448.3 108 . 1 
63 excess buying 3 ,707.4 871. 7 
64 excess selling -1,687.9 -380 . 7 
aS ource: (14). 
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4 /\ 
3 I \ 
2 I \ 
1 I A 
IA ---~ :--... L--'" 0 
B .............. ~ ---r---... -1 
~ r-----_ -2 
B 
63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
Source: (24) . 
Line (A) is capital balance for foreign exchange. 
Line (B) is financial capital balance excluding (A) . 
Figur e A.l. Derivation f or financial capital against civilian (Unit: 
one billion yen) 
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X. APPENDIX B: THE DATA CONCERNING LOCAL 
BANKS AND CITY BANKS 
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Table B.1 . The comparison of the rate of return on lendings between 
city banks and local banks (1957 and 1964)a 
Year 
57 The rate return on lendings 
The rate return on both lendings 
and debt 
The rate return on call money 
The proportion of call l oan's 
return against t otal return 
64 The rate return on lendings 
The rate return on both lendings 
and debt 
The rate r e turn on call money 
The pr oportion of call loan ' s 
return against t otal return 
aS ource: (4) and (5) . 
City Bank Local Bank 
Unit: % 
3.358 8. 774 
8.216 8 . 581 
8.203 11. 05 9 
0 . 600 2.600 
7.758 8 . 200 
7 . 628 8.052 
5 . 591 11.309 
0.100 5 . 400 
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Table B. 2 . The comparis on between city banks ' and local banks' lend ings 
toward large (A) and middle-small (B) enterprises (1953 - 1964)a 
Year 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
City Banks 
Lending b 
Toward (A) 
68.6 
71.4 
68 . .8 
67 . . ~ 
73. 5 
73.2 
72 . 1 
73.4 
74.4 
76.9 
79.5 
81. 0 
Lending 
Toward (B) 
31.4 
28.6 
31.2 
32 . 6 
26. 5 
26.8 
27 . 9 
26.6 
25 . 6 
23 . 1 
20.5 
19 . 0 
Unit: % 
Local Banks 
Lending 
Toward (A) 
38.0 
42.9 
41.8 
38.3 
42.5 
44 . 5 
44 . 3 
45 .6 
46.4 
49 . 3 
50 .4 
52 .4 
Lending 
Toward (B) 
62 . 0 
57. l 
58 . 2 
61. 7 
57 . 5 
55 . 5 
55.7 
54 .4 
53.6 
50 . 6 
49.7 
47 . 6 
aS ource: (24). 
bL . arge enterprises are defined as the companies which capitalized 
abov e fifty million yen. 
Table B. 3. The debt holdings between city banks and l ocal banks (1962-
1964)a 
Government Local Financ i al 
Year Debt Debt Debt Others 
Unit: 100 mill ion yen 
City Bank 62 31 277 299 188 
63 32 502 394 303 
64 34 716 665 393 
Local Ba nk 62 68 242 1,284 937 
63 68 312 1,456 1 ) 116 
64 64 393 1 ,418 1,402 
aSource: (5) . 
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Table B.4. The balance shee t of 'city banks ' and l ocal banks' lendings 
a by regiona l gr ou ps (1964) 
City Bank Loca l Bank 
Unit: 100 million yen 
Five Ma j or Deposit (A ) 89,374 (100%)b 14,966 (100'/o) b 
Cit ies Lendings (B) 84,325 (94.3%) 13 ,416 (89 . 6%) 
Balance of (A) & (B) 5 ,049 1 ,550 
Other Deposit (A) 13,808 (100%) 42,499 (100%) 
Ar eas 
Lendings (B) 7,782 (56 . 4%) 32,061 (75 .4%) 
Ba l ance of (A) & (B) 6 , 026 10 ,438 
Ca ll Loan 10 1 , 630 
Ca ll Money 7 ,277 313 
Difference -7,2 67 1 ,317 
Loan to Financial 
Institutions 37 
Debt to Financial 
Institutions 3'196 72 
Difference -3'196 - 35 
Depos it in Financia l 
I nstitutions 2,234 1,368 
Deposit from Financia l 
Institutions 7 '928 2,355 
Difference - 5,694 - 987 
Securities 17,2 30 7, 924 
Lendings from the 
Bank of Japan 13 ,365 137 
a Source : (5) . 
b 
Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of lendings against 
deposit . 
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Table B. 5 . The comparison between large and middle- smal l enterprises 
concern i ng the pr oportion of capital for acc orrm odat ion in 
t otal lendings (1963) 
Lar ge Enterprises Middle -Sma ll Enterprises 
Capital for Balance of Capital f or Balance of 
Accommodation Total Lendings Accommodation Total Lendings 
Ci ty Banks 
Local Banks 
13.6% 
3 . 7% 
47 .1% 
13.5% 
7. 5% 
11. 9% 
22.8% 
26 .0% 
Table B.6. City banks e;~ ternal debt from 1954 t o 1964 a 
Total Debt 
Capitgl Cr edit BJ ' s Call and Call 
Year Used Loan Loan Money Money 
Unit: 100 million yen 
54 2 7 '518 (100) c 2,346 ( 8 . 2) 2>122 ( 7. 7) 568 (2 .1) ( 9 . 8) 
55 31>977 (100) 834 ( 2 . 6) 291 ( 0 . 9) 747 (2 .3) ( 4 . 9) 
56 42 ,7 98 (100) 1>95 J. ( 4. 6) 1 , 170 ( 2.7) 910 (2 . 1) ( 6 . 7) 
57 50) 93 7 (100) 5,497 (10.8) 5,201 (10 . 2) 1,258 (2 .5) (13 . 3) 
58 56, 747 (100) 3 '960 ( 7.0 ) 3,361 ( 5 . 9) 1 ,806 (3 . 2) (10 .2) 
59 65'128 (100) 4,285 ( 6.6) 2,899 ( 4 . 4) 2 ,2 97 (3 .5) (10 . 1) 
60 79,387 (100) 5 > 733 ( 7.2) 4,349 ( 5 .5 ) 2,376 (3 . 0) (10 .2) 
61 98,801 (100 ) 13 ,320 ( 13. 5) 11 ' 1 77 ( 12 . 3 ) 1 , 903 ( 1. 9) (15 . 4) 
62 113 ,496 (100) 13 ,890 (12. 2) 11,894 (10.5) 3, 747 (3 . 3) (15 . 5 ) 
63 144' 162 (100) 13,283 ( 9.2) 10,847 ( 7 . 5) 5,542 (3 . 8 ) (14 . 0) 
64 168,555 (100) 13 ,622 ( 8. 1) 9,370 ( 5 .6 ) 10,810 (6 . 4) (14.5 ) 
a Source: (5) and (24). 
bTotal capital used = Capital +Debt. 
cNumbers in parentheses are the per centage against t otal capital used . 
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Table B. 7. Capital distribution for major f i nancial insti tutions in 
1961 and 197la 
City Bank 
Local Bank 
Trust Bank 
Long-term Credit Bank 
Mutual Bank 
Credit Bureau 
Others 
aSource: (24). 
1961 
(percent) 
39 . 2 
22 . 3 
8 . 1 
7 . 2 
8 . 8 
7 . 9 
6 .4 
1971 
(percent) 
35 . 4 
19.4 
10 . 6 
7 . 6 
8 . 4 
10 . 5 
8.1 
Table B. 8 . The averaged balance of call market money flow concerning 
city banks and local banks only (1953-1964)a 
Call Money Supplier Call Money Demander 
Ci ty Bank Local Bank City Bank Local Bank 
Year Unit: Percent 
53b,c 15. 7 15 . 5 56.3 14 . 9 
54b , c 30.1 30 . 1 77 . 2 7 . 3 
55b,c 20.1 20 .1 72. 7 6.8 
56b 17.1 26.5 63.2 5 .5 
57b 12 .o 21.4 61.2 6.1 
58b 14 .4 26.5 64.3 4.1 
59b 9.4 25.8 63 .4 3.4 
60b 2.7 23 . 3 55 .2 2.2 
6ld 6.5 17.7 43 .7 5 . 3 
62d 0 . 5 22.1 55 . 8 2.2 
63d 0.3 14 . 9 68. 7 3.5 
64d 0.1 11.5 80.5 2.4 
a 
Source: (13). 
b 
1953-1960 was the total of Tokyo and Osaka markets. 
c 
1953 - 1955, city banks included l ong-term credit bank. 
dl961 -1964 included newly es tablished Nagoya Market. 
71 
Table B.9. The statistics of city and local banks' owned capital in 
1972a 
Capital 
(a) 
Reserve Fund 
(b) 
~med Capital 
(a) + (b) 
Unit: 100 million yen 
8,216 32,568 (40,784 
aSource: (13) . 
Deposit & Debt 
(d) 
713,016 
a/d c/d a le 
1.2% 5.7% 20 . 1% 
Table B. 10 . Financial institutions' lending balance toward the enter -
a prises in selec ted years 
Toward Large Enterprises Toward Middle - Small Enterprisesb 
Year 
SS 
S9 
64 
69 
72 
58.8 
59.S 
61.4 
as ource: (13). 
57.6 
56.0 
S5 . l 
41.2 
40 . 5 
38 . 6 
bMiddle-small enterprises includes individuals . 
42.4 
44.0 
44.9 
c (A) Large enterprises which are capitalized above 10 million yen. 
d(B) Large enter prises which are capitalized above 50 mil lion yen . 
Table B.11 . The proportion of large enterprises ' loaning from city and 
local banks in selected years in percentagesa 
Year City Bank Local Bank 
(A) (B) (A) (B) 
5S 68.9 41.8 
59 72 .1 44 . 3 
64 81.0 76 . 0 S2 .4 44.6 
69 73.8 43.S 
72 69 . 6 4S.0 
a Source: (13) . 
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Table B.12 . The novement of city and local banks ' deposit i n selected 
a years 
1961 1968 1971 1973 
-percent -
Fixed Deposit against City Bank 51.5 52 .8 56.7 53 . 1 
Total Deposit Local Bank 62 . 6 60.l 60 . 3 57 . 2 
Persona l Deposit against City Bank 33 . 5 33.9 35 .7 32.5 
Total Deposit Local Bank 53.2 49 . 4 49.3 49.0 
Fixed Depos it against City Bank 39 . 7 44.5 46 . 7 43 .8 
Judir ical Person's Deposit Local Bank 46 . 2 44. 7 45.5 42.7 
Fixed Deposit against City Bank 71.2 75 . 5 74 . 8 71.3 
Per sonal Depos it Local Bank 75.7 75. 9 75 . 5 71. 5 
aS ource: (13). 
Table B. 13 . City and l ocal banks ' capi t al cost during 1958 to 1964a 
Averaged 
Deposit Non-
Interest Personal Personal Tax 
Year Rate Expenses Expenses Rate Total 
City Bank 
58 4 . 139 1.350 0 . 853 0 . 269 6 . 613 
59 4 . 260 1.260 0 . 811 0 . 237 6 . 568 
60 4 . 313 1.105 0 . 781 0 . 272 6.443 
61 4 . 066 1 . 118 0 . 794 0 . 24l~ 6 . 219 
62 4 . 061 1.077 0 . 830 0 . 241 6 . 240 
63b 3 . 882 1 . 052 0 . 817 0 .3 77 6 . 038 
64 3 . 9:!.7 1.050 0 . 817 0.377 6 . 161 
Local Bank 
58 4 . 408 1.522 0 . 685 0 . 299 6 . 914 
59 4 . 502 1.370 0 . 654 0 . 293 6 . 819 
60 4 . 490 1.301 0 . 627 0 . 311 6 . 729 
61 4. 176 1 . 256 0 . 658 0 . 402 6 . 492 
62 4 . 115 1.223 0 . 678 0 . 390 6 . 476 
63b 4 . 068 1.223 0 . 678 0 . 390 6 . 359 
64 4 . 033 1.224 0 . 688 1.074 7 . 019 
a Source: (5) . 
b 
Tax rate in 1964 included juridical person tax . 
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Table B.14. City and l ocal banks ' capital cost and the rate of r eturn 
f r om lendings in 1973a 
Interest rate for depos it 
Rate for per sonal and non-personal 
expenses 
Tax rate 
Cost for deposi t 
The interest rate for loan 
Cos t for de posi t , loan and call money 
Rate of return on lendings 
Profi t marginb from l endings 
a Source: (6) . 
City Bank Loca l Bank 
- percent-
4.133 3 . 941 
1.625 1. 847 
0 . 093 0 . 058 
5. 977 6 . 004 
4 .769 4.320 
5. 776 5 . 839 
6 .660 7 .263 
0 . 690 1.242 
bThe profi t margin a gainst the cost for deposit. 
Table B.15. a Current situation of the major c ity banks in September, 1972 
Capital Deposit & Debt 
Unit: 100 million yen 
Daiichi Kang yo 540 50' 632 
Mitsui 400 29,430 
Fuji 504 43,797 
Mitsubishi 504 42,046 
Ky ow a 240 20 ,885 
Sanwa 504 38 ,488 
Sumitomo 504 42 , 759 
Daiwa 240 18,220 
Takai 380 30 ,269 
Tokyo 300 19,334 
Nihon Kogyo 480 36,207 
Nihon Ch oki 340 28,299 
a Source: (6) • 
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Source: (13) . 
(A) indicates large enterprises and (B) indicates middle- small 
enterprises . (C) indicates individuals . 
Figure B.l. A graphic approach t o the additional city banks ' lendings 
(1967 - 1972) 
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XI. APPENDIX C : SUBJECT TO BANK-
REI.ATED ENTERPRISES 
Table C. 1. 
Year 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
76 
The pr oportj on of financial institutions ' !endings toward 
enter prises dur ing 1953 to 1964a 
Toward Large Ente r prises 
57.7 
60.0 
58.8 
57 . 1 
56 .4 
54 . 8 
53 . 5 
53.6 
53 .9 
51.4 
60.0 
60.9 
- percent -
Toward Middle -swall 
Enterprises 
42 . 3 
40 . 0 
41.2 
42 .9 
43 . 6 
45 . 2 
46 . 5 
46 . 4 
46.1 
48 . 6 
40 . 0 
39 . 1 
a Source : (24 ) . 
bMiddle-small ent erprises are defined as the enterpr ises or 
individuals wh ich are capitalized under 10 million yen . 
Tab le C. 2 . The difference of actual interest 
prise s during 1958 t o 1962a 
rate concerni ng the enter-
Gross Rate of I nteres t Actual Rate of Interest 
Large Middle -Small Large Middle-Small 
Year Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises Enterpr ises 
58 8 .43 9 . 67 8.62 10 . 54 
59 8.24 9 . 62 8.44 10 . 59 
60 8.44 9 . 59 8 . 63 10 . 66 
61 8.48 9 . 26 8 . 73 10.22 
62 8 . 55 9 .51 8 . 65 10.51 
aSource: (23) . 
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Table C. 3. The comparison of averaged loan interest rate between 
different sca l e of enterprises during 1956 to 1970a 
Enterprises ' 
Averaged 
Cap i tal 1956- 60 1961- 65 1966- 70 
Under 5 millions 17 . 02 14.05 13 . 29 
5- 10 mi 11 ions 14 . 99 15.02 13 . 96 
10-50 millions 14.27 15 . 43 14 .18 
50- 100 mill ions 13 . 38 14.44 13 . 60 
Abov e 100 mi 11 ions 9.56 10 . 02 9 . 85 
Above 1000 millions 8 . 52 9 . 32 9 . 26 
a 
Source: (24) . 
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Table C. 4. The ca pital distribution for juridical- person' 
in se l ected a year 
Against Total 
Capital Used Ab 
O,.,ned Capital 19 . 3 
Floating Debt 71. 9 
Fixed Debt 8 . 8 
Debenture 
Loans from Financial 
Institutions 24 . 1 
Long-term Loan from 
Financial Ins t itut ions 23.2 
Discount Draft against 
Cr edit Sell 26 .7 
Fixed Debt against 
Fixed Asset s 32 . 2 
aSource ! (16) . 
bA : under 2 million yen . 
CB: 2-10 million yen . 
de: 10-50 million yen . 
eD: 50-100 million yen . 
fE: 100- 1000 million yen . 
gF: above 1000 million yen . 
1964 
BC cc De 
-percent -
17.7 15 . 6 17 . 3 
73 . 6 70.8 64 . 3 
8 .7 13. 6 18.3 
0 . 1 
23 . 7 23 . 7 27.7 
21. 1 33 . 1 40 . 4 
27 . 6 49.1 44 .1 
31.4 46 . 7 52 . 5 
enterprises 
Ef Fg 
18 . 5 24. 5 
61. 7 49 . 5 
19.7 26 . 0 
0 . 1 5 .0 
27 . 8 34 .4 
44.4 49 . 5 
44 . 2 30 . 0 
53 . 0 56 . 3 
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'58 '59 '6::l 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 721 
Source: (11). 
A 
cur rency, deposit + sec urities 
avera ged amount of monthly sell 
B = c urrency, depos it +short-te rm securities 
averaged amount of monthly sell 
currency , deposit balance c = ~~~~-~--~-~ ......... -~~~~-'--~'--~ 
averaged amount of monthly sell 
Figure C.l . The money floating movement of major enterprises during 
1958 to 1972 
8 1 
21 
Unit: 0.1 bil l ion yen 
19 k 
######################################################### uncertaint # 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
Invest-
ment for 
a ccormno-
dation (A) 
Sour ce : 
Land St ocks 
invest - invest-
ment in ment 
(A) 
(11) . 
• 1970 ~ 1971 
• 1972 
Exces s Financ - Short Deposit 
c redit ing term and currency 
among securi-
enter- ties 
prises 
Figure C. 2 . The al t e r nation of capital demand for major enterprises 
1958 
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Source: (11) . 
A = the rate of actual profit balance 
B = owned financing power = owned capital 
object investment 
C = the rate of selling amount balance 
Objec t investment = investment of accormnodation 
+stocks' investment . 
Figure C. 3 . CMned f inancing power of maj or enterpr ises during 1958 to 
1972 
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XII . APPENDIX D: MISCELLANEOUS 
84 
Table D. l. Mutual stock sharing 
lendings in 1963a 
ratio of systematized city banks ' 
The rat io of The ratio of The ratio of stock 
mutual s t ock stock shar i ng s har i ng by sys t em-
Group sharing by maj or banks atized financial 
institutions 
- percent-
Mi tsu i 9 . 633 2 . 258 5 . 523 
Mitsub ishi 17.752 2 .709 12 . 540 
Sumitomo 19 . 189 4 .277 12 . 497 
Fuji 10 . 335 4.181 7 . 072 
Dai ichi 10 . 176 2 . 801 4 . 617 
Sanwa 9. 962 3.347 6 .428 
aS our ce: (26) . 
